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The link among board characteristics, corporate social responsibility
performance, and financial performance: Evidence from the hospitality and
tourism industry
Abstract
The aim of this study is twofold: to explore whether board characteristics (i.e. a sustainability
committee, board independence, board diversity, and board diligence) lead to greater corporate
social responsibility (CSR) performance, and to test whether CSR performance enhances firms’
financial performance in the hospitality and tourism (H&T) industry. Data were collected from the
Thomson Reuters Eikon database for the H&T firms listed there between 2011 and 2018. We
employed panel data analysis, after which we ran robustness tests. The results indicated that having
a CSR committee and female directors on the board are robust factors driving firms to show
superior CSR performance in all dimensions, including environmental, social, and governance
(ESG). Independent directors and directors’ diligence selectively enhance the overall CSR score
and individual pillars of CSR. Investigating the relationship between CSR performance and firms’
financial performance did not produce a significant outcome. The findings propose a
straightforward roadmap for H&T firms and policymakers to identify characteristics of CSRfriendly boards.
Keywords: CSR; ESG; social; environmental; governance; firm performance
1. Introduction
In the hospitality and tourism (H&T) industry, the basis of the tourism product is the social,
cultural, and natural capital of a destination (Moneva, Bonilla-Priego, & Ortas, 2019). While the
H&T industry brings economic and social benefits to destinations, it is criticized for its negative
impacts on societies and the natural environment, such as climate change, biodiversity loss, air and
noise pollution, and waste generation (de Grosbois, 2012; Scott, Peeters, & Gossling, 2010).
Criticisms also arise due to certain sectors within the H&T industry, such as fast-food restaurants
that cause obesity and casinos that provide opportunities for gambling. This stimulates firms in
these sectors to focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR) to decrease reputational costs (Rhou
& Singal, 2020). This places greater pressure on H&T firms to behave responsibly and to undertake
CSR practices, and thus makes it relevant to study CSR-related issues in the H&T context.
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There is a growing body of green governance literature which implies that boards should be
formed in such a way that they put environmental and social concerns high on the priority list of
the corporate agenda (Mahmood & Orazalin, 2017; Post, Rahman, & Rubow, 2011). In particular,
a board’s composition, activity, and structure may be influential in fostering firms’ CSR
commitment. The resource dependence theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978) and upper echelons theory (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) indicate that board
characteristics (BC) play crucial roles in the formulation and implementation of firms’ strategies.
Abundant studies have addressed the links between BC and CSR practices, particularly regarding
environment-focused firm practices (Bose, Khan, Rashid, & Islam, 2018; Post et al., 2011;
Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2016; Wang & Sarkis, 2017). These studies do not deliver a clear message
on the link between BC—such as board gender diversity, board meeting attendance, non-executive
board members, and CSR/sustainability committee—and CSR performance (CSRP), including
environmental, social, and governance performance. Negative impacts of H&T firms’ operations
on societies and environments justify studying the business case for CSR in the H&T context
(Rhou & Singal, 2020). However, few studies have examined how CSRP influences financial
performance related to value-based performance and profitability in the H&T industry; those that
have mostly documented ambiguous or contradictory findings (Benavides-Velasco, QuintanaGarcía, & Marchante-Lara, 2014; Franco, Caroli, Cappa, & Del Chiappa, 2019; GonzálezRodríguez, Martín-Samper, Köseoglu, & Okumus 2019; Kang, Lee, & Huh, 2010; Moneva et al.,
2019; Singal, 2014; Theodoulidis, Diaz, Crotto, & Rancati, 2017). Therefore, the primary purpose
of this study is to investigate how firms’ BC influences their CSRP, and to clarify the relationship
between CSRP and firms’ financial performance.
To achieve the purpose of this study, we considered firms operating in the H&T industry for
three reasons. First, in many countries, the H&T industry has a large influence on the social,
economic, and political environments as an export sector (UNWTO, 2016). Second, the structure
of the H&T industry or H&T firms is heavily related to the boundaries of several other industries
(Okumus, Altinay, & Chathoth, 2010). Third, according to Singal (2015), the H&T industry shows
higher leverage, risk, capital intensity, and competitive rivalry than other industries. These reasons
imply that H&T firms face challenges or opportunities in formulating and implementing CSR
strategies designed by firms’ board members. Consequently, BC in H&T firms should identify and
design efficient CSR practices that affect firms’ financial performance. Several studies link BC to
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H&T firms’ performance (Mu Yeh, 2013, 2018, 2019), but the links between BC, CSRP, and
financial performance in H&T firms are not clear (Guillet & Mattila, 2010). Although Ghaderi,
Mirzapour, Henderson, and Richardson (2019)1 examined the association between CSRP and hotel
performance, they used multiple proxies for performance, including financial, reputation,
productivity, and innovation performance, which does not allow for an assessment of the direct
association between CSRP and financial performance. Therefore, the findings of this study
represent a significant contribution to the H&T literature.
The data for the study were collected from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database regarding
H&T firms listed between 2011 and 2018. The cross-country nature of the data used in the study
improves the generalizability of the findings around the world. The data were subject to panel data
regression analysis with fixed effects estimators to test the hypothesized relationships. After
running baseline results, several robustness checks were run to verify the outputs.
After a literature review of CSR in the H&T industry, the study establishes a theoretical
background and develops the hypotheses. Next, we discuss the research methodology employed
in this study. Finally, we present and discuss the findings, provide theoretical and practical
implications, and make suggestions for future studies.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Corporate Social Responsibility in the Hospitality and Tourism Industry
Although initially CSR research in the H&T sector received less attention than in industries
that are seen as heavy polluters (i.e. chemicals, manufacturing, and mining), growing concerns
about the H&T industry’s negative social and environmental impacts have led researchers to pay
increasing attention to CSR issues in that industry (de Grosbois, 2012)2. However, CSR research
in the H&T industry is still slow (Mihalic, 2016) and minor compared to the research undertaken
in heavy polluter industries (Moyeen, Kamal, & Yousuf, 2019). While a strand of research has
studied the extent of CSR efforts implemented by H&T firms (Khatter, McGrath, Pyke, White, &
Lockstone-Binney, 2019; Kucukusta, Mak, & Chan, 2013; Suárez-Cebador, Rubio-Romero,
Pinto-Contreiras, & Gemar, 2018; Tsai, Hsu, Chen, Lin, & Chen, 2010), a further strand has
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The study was a country-specific study based on a questionnaire survey conducted in Iran.
Please see the papers of Coles et al. (2013), Font and Lynes (2018), Iyer and Jarvis (2019), and Moyeen et al. (2019)
for an extensive literature review on CSR in the H&T industry.
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examined the communication of such efforts (de Grosbois, 2012). The association between
corporate governance and CSR practices in the H&T industry has not yet been examined. This
study addresses this lack of research by exploring whether and how BC are associated with CSRP
in the H&T industry.
A stream of papers have analyzed the impact of CSR practices on various aspects of H&T
firms’ organizational performance, such as customer loyalty (Gürlek, Düzgün, & Meydan Uygur,
2017), employees’ work engagement (Gürlek & Tuna, 2019), organization citizenship behavior
(He, Zhang, & Morrison, 2019), reputation (Ghaderi et al., 2019), and productivity (Ghaderi et al.,
2019). Nevertheless, a limited number of studies have examined the impact of CSR practices on
firms’ financial performance in the H&T industry (Benavides-Velasco et al., 2014; Franco et al.,
2019; González-Rodríguez et al., 2019; Kang et al., 2010; Singal, 2014; Theodoulidis et al.,
2017)3. Further, most of these studies have focused on a particular sub-industry of the H&T
industry, such as hotels (Benavides-Velasco et al., 2014; González-Rodríguez et al., 2019) or a
single country (Benavides-Velasco et al., 2014; González-Rodríguez et al., 2019; Singal, 2014).
This study adds to the literature by examining the relationship between CSRP and financial
performance in the H&T industry, covering the sub-industries cruise lines, motels & hotels,
gaming & casinos, recreation industries & leisure, and bars & restaurants on a global scale. By
doing so, this study provides more generalizable findings on the relationship between CSRP and
financial performance in the H&T context.
2.2. Board Characteristics and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance
This study examines the association between BC and CSRP using the lenses of resource
dependence and upper echelons theories. A board of directors has two major functions: monitoring
(control role) and resource provision (service role) (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). First, monitoring
managers is important to ensure that their decisions and actions are in line with shareholders’
interests, and other stakeholders’ expectations and interests (Godos-Díez, Cabeza-García, AlonsoMartínez, & Fernández-Gago, 2018). In this context, a board of directors acts as an effective
monitoring mechanism for protecting stakeholders’ interests (Pucheta-Martínez & GallegoÁlvarez, 2019), ensuring the fulfillment of ethical, social, and environmental responsibilities
(García Martín & Herrero, 2019), and encouraging the management team to get involved in CSR
3
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activities (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez, 2019). Second, the resource dependence theory
refers to board capital, consisting of human capital (i.e. experience, expertise, knowledge, and
skills) and relational capital (i.e. network of ties to the external environment and stakeholders)
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). The resource-based view defines societal demands as part of the
external environment (Amran, Lee, & Devi, 2014). This view states that knowledge provided by
directors about the external environment and stakeholders may help firms to effectively address
CSR issues and perform better CSR activities (Godos-Díez et al., 2018). Further, the upper
echelons theory argues that directors’ and executives’ decisions and decision-making processes
reflect their experience, knowledge, personalities, skills, and values (Hambrick, 2007). These
upper echelon members with their diverse characteristics affect firms’ strategic decisions related
to both financial and non-financial issues (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Shahab, Ntim, Chengang,
Ullah, & Fosu, 2018), and thus their CSRP.
To better understand the relationship between BC and CSRP, we considered four BC—board
gender diversity, board diligence, non-executive board members, and CSR/sustainability
committee—and four CSRP indicators—composite ESG4 score and its three sub-dimensions:
environmental, social, and governance indicators. Examining these indicators is effective because
they are used alone or in pairs to identify relationships between them in the manufacturing industry
(Buchanan, Cao, & Chen, 2018; Chen, Feldmann, & Tang, 2015; García-Sánchez, Hussain, &
Martínez-Ferrero, 2019; Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2015; McGuinness, Vieito, & Wang, 2017; Wang &
Sarkis, 2017). In this study, we consider all the BC simultaneously, as components of the model
seen in Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
This proposed conceptual model addresses linkages between BC and CSRP and, subsequently,
CSRP and the financial performance of firms. The first four constructs under BC are included
when considering resource dependence and upper echelons theories because they may drive CSRP
and the financial performance of firms.
2.2.1. Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance

4

For this research, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) scores are used to measure the CSRP of H&T firms.
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Board gender diversity is the first component of BC in the model. According to the resourcebased view, female directors enhance a board’s monitoring ability by bringing different
perspectives, knowledge, skills, and experiences to the boardroom (Adams & Ferreira, 2009;
Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007). This view suggests that female directors who serve as
providers of human and relational capital improve a firm’s CSRP by building relations with the
external environment and all stakeholders (Mallin & Michelon, 2011). From the perspective of
upper echelons theory, directors with different knowledge, skills, and expertise may influence a
firm’s strategic decisions, and thus improve its financial and non-financial performance (Shahab
et al., 2018). Research has shown that female directors tend to have more ethical and social abilities
than their male counterparts and are more likely to behave socially and environmentally
responsibly (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez, 2019). In this context, females in upper
echelons can urge the board to make relevant decisions concerning CSR issues and encourage
management to undertake CSR-related activities, which lead to greater CSRP. Empirically, Mallin
and Michelon (2011) found a significant positive relationship between gender diversity on the
board and employee relations and human rights performance. Likewise, Bear, Rahman, and Post
(2010) showed that the number of women board members positively influences CSR strength
ratings in the firms included in Fortune’s 2009 Most Admired List. Further, García Martín and
Herrero (2019), Hussain, Rigoni, and Orij (2018), Orazalin and Baydauletov (2020), and Post,
Rahman, and McQuillen (2015) determined that the presence of female directors improves firms’
performance related to CSR. In line with theoretical discussions and prior empirical findings, the
following hypothesis (H) is proposed:
H1: Gender diversity on H&T firms’ boards is positively associated with (a) ESG performance,
(b) environmental performance, (c) social performance, and (d) governance performance as
components of CSRP.
2.2.2. Board Diligence and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance
The second component of BC selected in this study is the average attendance at board
meetings, due to its effect on the strategy formulation and implementation process (Chou, Chung,
& Yin, 2013; Gafoor, Mariappan, & Thyagarajan, 2018; Lin, Yeh, & Yang, 2014). There are two
opposing views regarding the link between board activity and firms’ performance. On the one
hand, the board meeting frequency is considered to be a sign of board effectiveness, which would
6

lead to better corporate management control (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) and improve firms’
performance in terms of financial and non-financial outcomes. On the other hand, a high number
of meetings may reflect a board’s ineffectiveness, and thus would be negatively associated with
firms’ performance.
Several studies (see Eluyela, Akintimehin, Okere, Ozordi, Osuma, Ilogho, & Oladipo, 2018;
Mishra & Mohanty, 2014; Vafeas, 1999; Webb, 2004) indicated a relationship between the number
of board meetings and firms’ performance. Further, Burke, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2019)
documented that the meeting frequency of sustainability committees positively impacts their
effectiveness. However, the connection between CSRP and board diligence has not been
investigated, with a few exceptions (Godos-Díez et al., 2018; Hussain et al., 2018). While Hussain
et al. (2018) determined that frequent board meetings enhance the social performance of firms,
Godos-Díez et al. (2018) failed to find a significant association between the number of board
meetings and firms’ CSR engagement. Since the number of meetings is expected to play a vital
role in the development of CSR strategies, the following hypothesis is formulated:
H2: Board diligence (i.e. the average board meeting attendance rate) in H&T firms’ boards is
positively associated with (a) ESG performance, (b) environmental performance, (c) social
performance, and (d) governance performance as components of CSRP.
2.2.3. Non-Executive Board Members and Corporate Social Responsibility Performance
The presence of non-executive board members on a firm’s board is the third component of BC
in the model. This characteristic concern whether there are non-executive directors on a firm’s
board; the term can be used interchangeably with independent directors (Kiliç, Kuzey, & Uyar,
2015). Non-executive board members may ensure board independence from management, and
improve the board’s objectivity and its ability to represent multiple perspectives (Michelon &
Parbonetti, 2012). Board independence is expected to be positively associated with CSRP, since
independent directors are relatively less subjected to pressure from managers and shareholders
than other directors (Hussain et al., 2018) and their mission is to align the interests of shareholders,
managers, and stakeholders (Fernandes, 2008; Hoitash, 2011; Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, &
Davidson, 1992). Further, independent directors may successfully address stakeholders’ interests
by providing new resources and insights and using their contacts and business expertise (Post et
al., 2015). Empirically, Hussain et al. (2018), Mallin and Michelon (2011), and Post et al. (2015)
7

documented that a higher proportion of independent directors leads to a greater level of CSRP.
Therefore, the following hypothesis is suggested:
H3: The presence of non-executive board members on H&T firms’ boards is positively
associated with (a) ESG performance, (b) environmental performance, (c) social performance,
and (d) governance performance as components of CSRP.
2.2.4. Corporate Social Responsibility/Sustainability Committee and Corporate Social
Responsibility Performance
The last component of BC in the model is CSR/sustainability committees, referring to the
existence of a sub-committee dedicated to CSR-related issues operating within the firm’s board
structure. A firm can implement various activities and programs at the board level to better manage
relations with stakeholders and deal with social and environmental issues, such as establishing a
particular CSR/sustainability committee (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). The creation of
CSR/sustainability committees may reflect a firm’s willingness to engage in CSR practices to meet
stakeholders’ needs (Mallin & Michelon, 2011). According to resource dependence theory, a
CSR/sustainability committee can be regarded as an important human capital resource element
that supervises all issues related to CSR activities (Pucheta-Martínez & Gallego-Álvarez, 2019)
and promotes socially and environmentally responsible management (Amran et al., 2014). In terms
of empirical evidence, García Martín and Herrero (2019), Godos-Díez et al. (2018), Hussain et al.
(2018), and Mallin and Michelon (2011) showed that the existence of a board sub-committee
responsible for CSR issues positively impacted firms’ CSR engagement. In line with theoretical
discussions and prior empirical findings, the following hypothesis is developed:
H4: The existence of a sub-committee responsible for CSR activities reporting to H&T firms’
boards is positively associated with (a) ESG performance, (b) environmental performance, (c)
social performance, and (d) governance performance as components of CSRP.
2.2.5. Corporate Social Responsibility Performance and Financial Performance
As seen in Figure 1, our model tests the impact of CSRP measured with an aggregate ESG
score as well as its three dimensions (i.e. environmental, social, and governance) on the financial
performance of H&T firms. First, the environmental dimension of CSRP has a crucial role in the
case of the H&T sector, because it is increasingly linked to the quality of the tourism product
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(Benavides-Velasco et al., 2014). Environment-related practices can provide financial benefits to
H&T firms, for example, through saving energy and water and being highly valued by stakeholders
(Suárez-Cebador et al., 2018). Kucukusta et al. (2013) determined that environmental aspects of
CSR are one of the most important factors impacting willingness to pay, preference to stay, and
brand image in the hotel industry. Second, the social dimension of CSRP, covering practices such
as supporting social projects in the local area, implementing equality and non-discriminatory hiring
policies in the workplace, supplying healthy and certified local food, and adapting facilities for
disabled customers, can give hotel firms competitive advantages (Tsai et al., 2010). Regarding the
social dimension, Ghaderi et al. (2019) argued that support for community and society well-being
and the protection of local culture and heritage may significantly improve hotels’ financial
performance, reputation, productivity, and innovation capabilities. Third, good corporate
governance practices ensure effective monitoring by the board and give companies the ability to
address stakeholders’ demands properly (Moneva et al., 2019). A proper response to stakeholders’
expectations and demands enhances corporate reputation (Ghaderi et al., 2019) and legitimacy
(Cullinan, Mahoney, & Roush, 2018), resulting in greater financial performance. Consequently,
CSR practices in terms of environment, society, and governance are expected to lead to better
financial results in the H&T sector.
The literature provides mixed results about how CSR activities influence firms’ performance
(Jamali & Karam, 2018). McWilliams and Siegel (2000) found that CSR’s impact on financial
performance is neutral. Many studies (Bird, Hall, Momentè, & Reggiani, 2007; Orlitzky, Schmidt,
& Rynes, 2003; Saeidi, Sofian, Saeidi, Saeidi, & Saaeidi, 2015; Wang & Sarkis, 2017)
demonstrated a positive relationship between CSR activities and financial performance, while
other studies (Lima Crisóstomo, de Souza Freire, & Cortes de Vasconcellos, 2011) indicated a
negative relationship. Wang and Sarkis (2017) clarified the link between CSRP and financial
performance by considering value-based performance (Tobin Q) and profitability (return on assets
[ROA]) via a sample of 1,980 firm-year observations from the top 500 green companies in the
United States over 2009–2013. With a particular focus on the H&T industry, a number of studies
(Benavides-Velasco et al., 2014; Boluk, 2013; Ghaderi et al., 2019; Qu, 2014; Zhu, 2013)
examined the influence of CSR activities on financial performance and documented that greater
CSRP results in better financial outcomes. Therefore, the last hypothesis is:
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H5: CSRP components (a) ESG performance, (b) environmental performance, (c) social
performance, and (d) governance performance in H&T firms are positively associated with the
financial performance of firms measured via (a) value-based performance (Tobin Q) and (b)
profitability (ROA).
3. Research Methodology
3.1. Sample
The data for this study were collected from the Thomson Reuters Eikon (hereafter Eikon)
database for H&T firms listed between 2011 and 2018. The Eikon database contains some of the
broadest and deepest firm-level financial analysis data accessible. It provides industry-leading data
including financial news, stock price data, financial ratios, BC, board meeting attendance, CSR
committees, ESG scores, and company fundamentals (corresponding to 99% of the global market
capitalization extending over 150 countries and more than 72,000 listed companies), among others.
The Eikon database also allows for the retrieval of ESG-related data on thousands of firms
(Refinitiv, 2019a).
The Eikon database classifies firms into 10 main economic sectors, 28 business sectors, and a
further 54 industry groups according to their activities. It lists H&T as one of the industry groups,
including cruise lines, motels & hotels, gaming & casinos, recreation industries & leisure, and bars
& restaurants (Refinitiv, 2019b). Hence, all data for these industries were retrieved from the Eikon
database. Prior studies using financial and ESG data as well as BC data retrieved from the Eikon
database include Arayssi, Jizi, and Tabaja (2019), Dell’Atti, Trotta, Iannuzzi, and Demaria (2017),
Gallego-Álvarez and Pucheta-Martínez (2020), and Helfaya and Moussa (2017). The BC
(including board gender diversity, board diligence, board independence, CSR committee, and
board size), ownership-related data (free float percentage), and financial control variables (such as
firm size, leverage, and profitability) were selected based on De Beelde and Tuybens (2015), Liao,
Lin, and Zhang (2018), and Uyar, Karaman, and Kilic (2020).
Dell’Atti et al. (2017), Luo, Wang, Raithel, and Zheng (2015), and Wang, Hsieh, and Sarkis
(2018) used ESG scores as proxies for CSRP. The ESG scores range between 0 (worst) and 100
(best) (Dell’Atti et al., 2017). The Eikon database’s ESG scores are computed from firm-reported
data and are tailored to openly and objectively evaluate a firm’s ESG performance, commitment,
10

and potency across 10 matters: innovation, emissions, resource use, human rights, workforce,
management, product responsibility, CSR strategy, shareholders, and community. ESG data are
available for more than 7,000 companies going back to 2002; however, a smaller number of firms’
ESG scores are disclosed in earlier years. ESG scores (as used in this study) enhance and replace
the previously well-known Asset4® Equal Weighted Ratings. The ESG data correspond to 70% of
worldwide market capitalization, including 178 critical ESG metrics.
The Eikon’s ESG performance percentile ranking methodology calculates relative ranks. The
methodology calculates 10 category scores (for resource use, emissions, etc.) based on the number
of companies that have (a) a score, (b) a poorer score than the current firm, and (c) the same score
(Refinitiv, 2020). The 10 category scores are then added up to environmental, social, and corporate
governance scores and the final ESG score5. Category scores are the sum of (equally weighted)
pertinent individual critical ESG indicators (Refinitiv, 2020). The Environment Pillar score
assesses firms’ performance in evading environmental risks and caring for the environment under
three categories: emissions, resource use, and innovation scores (Refinitiv, 2020). The Social Pillar
score evaluates how firms maintain diversity and equal opportunity within the workforce, comply
with human rights, promote community development, and deliver goods and services in a safe and
healthy way (Refinitiv, 2020). The Governance Pillar score measures firm management’s ability
and success in communicating firms’ CSR practices with stakeholders, treating shareholders
equally, and implementing corporate governance principles (Refinitiv, 2020).
The initial sample size of the research data set was 940 firm-year records. Data preprocessing
is a crucial step before further analysis. Therefore, the raw data set was subjected to multiple
imputation and outlier detection. Initially, the variables with missing values were imputed.
Furthermore, outliers were detected using a minimum covariance determinant (MCD) estimator to
robustify the Mahalanobis distances (Verardi & Dehon, 2010). Following the MCD multivariate
outlier detection approach, 20 extreme firm-year records were removed from the data set. The final
sample size was 920 firm-year records. Additionally, the leverage control variable had a high
range, with a high dispersion around the mean value. Therefore, it was winsorized in both tails at
one percent to replace the extreme values in both tails.

5
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The sample included 172 firms. The number of firms within each year in the panel data is not
stable. There are 78 firms in 2011, 88 firms in 2012, 90 firms in 2013, 96 firms in 2014, 111 firms
in 2015, 138 firms in 2016, 154 firms in 2017, and 165 firms in 2018. The final sample was 920
firm-year records6.
3.2. Variables
We adopted five sets of variables for the dimensions in this study: CSRP, firm performance,
BC, ownership structure, and financial variables. First, CSRP was proxied by the composite ESG
score, as well as its three individual scores (Eliwa, Aboud, & Saleh, 2019; Garcia, Mendes-DaSilva, & Orsato, 2017). Second, firm performance was assessed by two well-known and frequently
used financial performance indicators, namely Tobin Q and ROA (Inoue & Lee, 2011; Kang et al.,
2010, 2010; Rhou, Singal, & Koh, 2016; Wang & Sarkis, 2017). While Tobin Q is a market-based
performance indicator, ROA is an accounting-based one. Tobin Q takes into account the market
value of firms on the stock exchange. ROA considers net income and total assets, which are both
drawn from financial statements (i.e. income statement and balance sheet). Therefore, these two
measures assess different aspects of firm performance. Within the framework of this study, while
Tobin Q assesses whether shareholders attach value to firms’ CSRP, ROA measures whether
CSRP enhances firm profitability through improving sales as well as controlling costs. Third, BC
were measured by board diversity, board diligence, board independence, having a CSR committee
at the board level, board size (as a control variable), and CEO duality (as a control variable)
(Chams & García-Blandón, 2019; Naciti, 2019; Yekini, Adelopo, Andrikopoulos, & Yekini,
2015). Fourth, ownership structure was proxied by free float percentage (i.e. the rate of shares not
owned by controlling shareholders and freely traded by investors) (Black, De Carvalho, & Gorga,
2010; Kuzey & Uyar, 2017). Fifth, financial variables, such as firm size, leverage, and profitability,
were incorporated as control variables (Kang et al., 2010; Rhou et al., 2016; Youn, Hua, & Lee,
2015). These financial variables were included as control variables for measuring CSRP for the
following reasons: larger firms endure more public scrutiny in terms of environmental and social
sensitivity; highly leveraged firms alleviate the sustainability concerns of credit providers and
reduce borrowing costs through CSR engagement; and profitable firms have higher financial

6
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capacity to make costly CSR investments (Kuzey & Uyar, 2017). These variables were included
as control variables for measuring firms’ financial performance for the following reasons: firm
size may impact firms’ financial performance through economies of scale (Lee, 2009); and
leverage influences firms’ financial performance due to its disciplining role (González, 2013) and
the provision of capital for investment (Vithessonthi & Tongurai, 2015). The definitions of the
variables used in this study are provided in Table A in the Appendix.
3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows a summary of the sample with the included variables. The descriptive statistics
concerning CSRP indicated that the mean ESGscore is 49.66% ± 17.23%, the ENVpilscore is
50.71% ± 21.08%, the SOCpilscore is 51.55% ± 21.72%, and the GOVpilscore is 46.29% ±
19.73%. Additionally, the BC showed that the mean Bindepend is 73.55% ± 16.18%, Bdiversity
is 16.10% ± 12.32%, and Bdiligence is 87% ± 10.44%. The mean values of the financial variables
indicated that leverage is 60.93% ± 27.62%, profitability is 6.86% ± 7.12%, and Tobin Q is 1.87
± 1.50. The firm-year records indicated that 46.20% of the firms have CSR committees and 45%
demonstrate the existence of CEOduality.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
3.4. Correlation Analysis
Table 2 presents the bivariate linear relationship with respect to Pearson’s correlation analysis.
According to the analysis results, ESGscore, ENVpilscore, SOCpilscore, and GOVpilscore have
significant positive linear relationships with CSRcommittee, Bindepend, Bdiversity, and
Bdiligence (p < 0.05). In addition, Tobin Q has no significant linear association with ESGscore,
ENVpilscore, and GOVpilscore (p > 0.05), but a significant negative linear association with
SOCpilscore (p < 0.05). Profitability has no significant linear relationship with ESGscore,
SOCpilscore, and GOVpilscore (p > 0.05), but a significant negative linear relationship with
ENVpilscore (p < 0.05).
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
3.5. Empirical Methodology
This study uses two models: Model 1 is to test the association between BC and CSRP, and
Model 2 is to examine the association between CSRP and financial performance. Both models
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were subjected to panel data regression analysis with fixed effects estimators. The research data
are based on firm-year panel data. The records include repeated observations for the same variables
for eight years between 2011 and 2018. Due to the data structure, we used panel data regression
analysis with fixed effects estimators as the primary research analysis tool to test the proposed
hypotheses. The two models are formulated based on the hypotheses as:
yit = α + xitβ +υi + ϵit

(1)

In Model 1, “yit” shows CSRP, “xit” shows the BC and control variables, “υi + ϵit” is the error
term, the index “i” represents firm and the index “t” represents year. CSRP is proxied by ESGscore,
ENVpilscore, SOCpilscore, and GOVpilscore, while BC is proxied by CSRcommittee, Bindepend,
Bdiversity, and Bdiligence. Similarly, in Model 2 “yit” represents firm performance and “xit”
represents CSRP and the control variables, while firm performance is proxied by two indicators:
Tobin Q and profitability (ROA).
To decide between using a random effects estimator and a fixed effects estimator, we
employed Hausman’s specification test (Hausman, 1978). The Hausman’s test results showed that
the null hypothesis (H0: Difference in coefficients not systematic—random effects) is rejected (pvalues < 0.05) in Model 1 and Model 2. Thus, the individual-level effects sufficiently modeled by
a random effects estimator are rejected in favor of a fixed effects estimator.
4. Findings and Discussion
The results of Model 1 with fixed effects estimators are shown in Table 3. Accordingly,
CSRcommittee (p < 0.01), Bindepend (p < 0.01), Bdiversity (p < 0.01), and Bdiligence (p < 0.05)
have a significant positive relationship with ESGscore (Column 1) and GOVpilscore (Column 4).
In addition, CSRcommittee (p < 0.01) and Bdiversity (p < 0.01) have a significant positive
association with ENVpilscore, but Bindepend and Bdiligence have no significant association with
ENVpilscore (Column 2). Finally, CSRcommittee (p < 0.01), Bdiversity (p < 0.01), and Bdiligence
(p < 0.05) have a significant positive relationship with SOCpilscore, but Bindepend has no
significant relationship with SOCpilscore (Column 3). These results confirm the validity of H1
and H4 and all their sub-hypotheses, and support the main hypotheses of H2 (a, c, d) and H3 (a, d)
with some of their sub-hypotheses. The results are discussed in line with prior studies in the
following paragraphs, but theoretical and practical implications are suggested in the last section of
the study.
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The evidence concerning the association between board gender diversity and CSRP or
reporting is mixed in the literature depending on the context. While some studies conducted in
developed countries found a positive relationship between the proportion of females on boards and
CSRP (García Martín & Herrero, 2020; Mallin & Michelon, 2011), other studies implemented in
emerging countries found a negative relationship (Gallego-Álvarez & Pucheta-Martínez, 2020;
Muttakin, Khan, & Subramaniam, 2015). The contrasting evidence might arise from the
empowerment or skills of female directors in these two types of countries. Although these studies
shed light on the role of female directors in CSR practices, they were not conducted for the H&T
industry; accordingly, they do not provide sectoral implications. The findings of our study show
that female directors are influential in all dimensions of CSRP, implying that they are an important
mechanism of firm governance in pursuing CSR goals in the H&T industry.
Few studies have investigated the link between board diligence and the CSRP or disclosure of
firms (García Martín & Herrero, 2020; Giannarakis, 2014; Hussain et al., 2018). The cited studies
mostly used the number of meetings rather than directors’ board meeting attendance rate, as in our
study. The number of board meetings alone does not play a precise role in the efficiency of board
meetings; García Martín and Herrero (2020) and Hussain et al. (2018) propose two contrasting
views that more frequent meetings may indicate efficiency as well as inefficiency of board
meetings. Their findings appear to be in line with other contradicting perspectives: Hussain et al.
(2018) found a positive association between board meeting frequency and environmental
performance, but not social performance; García Martín and Herrero (2020) found a positive
association between board meeting frequency and environmental performance7; and Giannarakis
(2014) found that board meeting frequency had a neutral effect on CSRP. However, our study uses
a better proxy for board diligence: directors’ board meeting attendance rate (Lin et al., 2014).
Unlike the number of meetings, directors’ participation reflects the efficiency of corporate board
meetings. In line with the theoretical proposition, we found that the higher the directors’ meeting
attendance rate, the higher the composite CSRP as well as social and governance performance.
This finding justifies that board diligence enhances the monitoring effectiveness of directors on
boards (Yekini et al., 2015).

7

This study used only the environmental dimension of CSRP.
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Independent board members are tough monitors and aim to align the interest of managers with
those of shareholders (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). With the growing importance of CSR, recent
studies proposed that independent directors may also align the interests of firms with those of
stakeholders (Gallego-Álvarez & Pucheta-Martínez, 2020), and tested this proposition by
incorporating board independence in CSR studies. However, the findings are inconclusive; some
studies found that board independence improves CSR engagement (Arayssi et al., 2019; GallegoÁlvarez & Pucheta-Martínez, 2020), others found that it decreases (Adel, Hussain, Mohamed, &
Basuony, 2019), and still others found a neutral effect (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Therefore,
our study provides additional evidence of the influence of independent directors on CSRP. The
findings show independent directors’ limited interference in CSR issues; while they are influential
in the governance dimension of CSR, they are not at all influential in the environmental and social
dimensions.
Moreover, the findings of prior studies regarding the association between CSR committees
and CSRP or reporting largely proved the existence of a positive relationship between the two
variables, regardless of context, although there are some exceptions. While some European studies
found a positive association between CSR committee and CSRP (Adel et al., 2019; García Martín
& Herrero, 2020), another study sampling European and US firms found only a weak association
between CSR committee and the social dimension of CSR disclosure, but not other dimensions;
the authors attribute this situation to the immaturity or small proportion of CSR committees in the
sampled firms (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Past evidence also indicated that CSR committees
are influential in fostering CSR practices of firms in emerging countries (Arayssi et al., 2019;
Gallego-Álvarez & Pucheta-Martínez, 2020). As sectoral evidence, Uyar et al. (2020) proved that
logistics firms with CSR committees are more likely to publish a higher number of CSR reports
over the years. Therefore, the finding of this study is in line with those of most prior studies and
demonstrates that CSR committees are influential particularly in the H&T industry’s CSR
commitment. H&T firms with CSR committees are more likely to achieve higher composite CSRP
as well as greater environmental, social, and governance performance.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Moreover, in Model 2, we tested whether firm financial performance proxied by Tobin Q (i.e.
market-based performance) and ROA (i.e. accounting-based performance) is associated with
16

CSRP. Table 4 provides the panel data regression with fixed effects analysis results for this
investigation. The testing CSRP variables proxied by ESGscore, ENVpilscore, SOCpilscore, and
GOVpilscor are not simultaneously subjected to the panel regression analysis due to their high
correlation (see the correlation analysis results in Table 2). Therefore, the risk of multicollinearity
is eliminated.
Initially, the results showed that ESGscore, ENVpilscore, SOCpilscore, and GOVpilscore
have no significant association with Tobin Q in (p-values > 0.05, Columns 1–4). Additionally, the
results of the relationship between CSRP and profitability (ROA) as another indicator of firm
performance revealed that ESGscore (p-value < 0.10) and GOVpilscore (p-value < 0.10) have
weak significant negative relationships with ROA, SOCpilscore (p-value < 0.05) has a significant
negative relationship with ROA, and ENVpilscore has no significant relationship with ROA
(Columns 5–8). Thus, H5 is not supported, revealing that CSRP does not necessarily lead to
positive financial performance in the H&T industry.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The association between CSRP and financial performance is argued on two contrasting
grounds: one approach is that CSR causes firms to incur additional costs and thus reduces firms’
financial performance; another is that CSR promises competitive advantage in the marketplace and
thus increases firms’ performance (Lee, Seo, & Sharma, 2013). In line with these two conflicting
views, the findings of prior studies are inconclusive. While Inoue and Lee (2011) found an
insignificant association between CSRP and financial performance in most of the study models,
they determined rarely positive and negative associations depending on the tourism subsector
chosen, dependent variable specification (ROA or Tobin Q) or chosen sub-CSR dimension. Youn
et al. (2015) proved a positive link for larger firms rather than the overall sample in the restaurant
industry. Drawing on a synthesis of a comprehensive literature review, Coles, Fenclova, and Dinan
(2013) concluded that the findings on the CSRP and firm performance nexus are unequivocal. In
line with these prior studies, our results also did not produce consistent outcomes; while the fixed
effects estimator did not yield any significant result for Tobin Q, composite CSRP as well as social
and governance indicators produced significant negative results for ROA, confirming the approach
that CSR causes additional costs.
4.1. Robustness Checks
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Model 1 and Model 2 were subjected to robustness checks using ordinary least square (OLS)
regression analysis. Table 5 presents Model 1’s analysis results. The results confirmed all the
significant relationships except one (between Bindepend and GOVpilscore) found in Table 3.
Moreover, the insignificant associations between Bindepend and ENVpilscore, Bindepend and
SOCpilscore, and Bdiligence and ENVpilscore obtained in Table 3 were all found significant (p <
0.01) in robustness tests. We conclude that the findings regarding the BC driving CSRP are robust
compared to alternative methodologies.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Similarly, Model 2 was also subjected to robustness checks using OLS. The results are given
in Table 6. Based on the obtained results, none of the CSRP indicators has a significant association
with Tobin Q, which indicates consistency with the initial analysis. Only ESGscore (p-value <
0.05) and GOVpilscore (p-value < 0.01) have a significant positive association with profitability,
contrary to the negative associations obtained in Table 4. Hence, it can be said that the association
between CSRP and ROA varies depending on the methodology chosen.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
5. Conclusions
In this study, we tested and explored whether the characteristics of corporate boards are likely
to affect the CSRP of H&T companies, and whether CSRP plays a role in enhancing firms’
performance. We hope that our study will help sector representatives design corporate structures
that enhance their CSRP. Our study draws significant conclusions that are robust compared to
alternative methodologies and are based on a cross-country sample.
The results suggest that CSR committees make a significant difference in driving firms’ CSR
engagements. This result is confirmed for the composite ESG score and individual ESG pillars,
including environmental, social, and governance. This implies that CSR committees are influential
in pursuing CSR goals and addressing stakeholders’ demands in all dimensions. Our findings
validate the necessity of board sub-committees, in which specific tasks are assigned to fewer
decision-makers. Second, an independent board of directors is particularly effective in improving
firms’ overall CSR commitments and the governance pillar. This might mean that independent
directors are appointed to boards to strengthen the governance structure, through which long-term
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value generation is enabled and shareholders’ interests are met. Third, the ratio of female directors
on boards is highly influential in driving firms to engage with all CSR dimensions. The findings
and propositions of prior studies assert that women are more philanthropically driven and
community-oriented, have diverse perspectives, and bring unique experiences and competencies
to boards. Fourth, disciplined directors also contribute to the composite score and the social and
governance pillars of CSR engagement. By participating in board meetings, directors have a
chance to be knowledgeable about CSR investments, vote for investing in specific CSR projects,
and follow up on the outcomes of those projects, since those meetings are the primary decisionmaking platform for such investments. Finally, CSRP does not enhance firms’ performance as
proxied by both value-based and accounting-based indicators.
6. Theoretical and Practical Implications
The findings imply that the resource dependence and upper echelons theories explain the
CSRP of H&T firms well. In line with the resource dependence theory, female directors and CSR
committees might enrich H&T firms’ CSR agenda, engagement with their experience, expertise,
knowledge, and skills, and communication of CSRP with external parties. In line with the upper
echelons theory, the study proves the influence of upper level corporate structure and meetings on
corporate decision-making and shaping firms’ CSR practices. The only weak link between board
structure and CSRP is the effect of independent directors on CSRP. For each of the hypothesized
links, the study provides practical implications in the following paragraphs.
The findings propose a straightforward roadmap for H&T firms and policymakers to follow
to identify the characteristics of CSR-friendly boards that pursue, monitor, and prioritize the CSR
commitment of firms. First, as CSR committees and gender diverse boards improve all types of
CSR engagements, H&T sector representatives may formulate or redesign corporate policies to
establish specific CSR committees and open seats to female directors on the boards. The findings
highlight the importance of board structure in pursuing CSR goals as the ultimate decision-making
body in corporations. It is hoped that CSR policies shaped at board level might have a domino
effect on the lower hierarchical levels of management and human resource structure, ultimately
aligning H&T firms with more environmentally and socially responsible practices. Already
existing rates of CSR committees (46.2%) and board diversity (16.1%) can be raised. However,
the scarcity of women in the sector might be a symptom of gender inequality in the H&T academia
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since Khoo-Lattimore, Yang, and Je (2019) point out underrepresentation of women in tourismrelated academic conferences and calling for more women participation in the events. In 2010, the
United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) also released a report highlighting the
gender gap in international tourism (Khoo-Lattimore, Yang, & Je, 2019). At this point, H&T
schools may undertake an important role to educate future women leaders and practitioners by
countering gender discrimination (if exists), updating curricula, teaching soft skills along with hard
skills which eventually may serve to empower women in the sector (Mooney, 2020). Second, as
board diligence is a significant predictor of composite CSRP as well as social and governance
pillar performance, it implies that social and managerial issues of H&T firms are the subjects of
board meetings. However, as board diligence is not a significant predictor of the environmental
pillar, it might signal that environmental issues are not prioritized on the corporate agenda as much
as other CSR issues. Hence, the environmental dimension of CSR requires closer attention in board
meetings and from directors of H&T firms due to the sector’s negative influence on the
environment (e.g. carbon emissions from air transportation and accommodation), as well as its
economic self-interest in protecting the environment.
Third, despite the high rate of independent directors on boards (73.55%), they have limited
influence on the CSR commitment of H&T firms; they have an effect on the composite CSR score
as well as the governance pillar. This finding casts doubt on the efficacy or responsibility of
independent directors regarding environmental and social issues. This situation can be explained
by the fact that they might focus on financial issues and oversight of managers to secure the
interests of shareholders. They may consider environmental and social initiatives as nonessential
and regard them as activities that distract them from their primary goal of pursuing shareholders’
interests. Moreover, independent directors might leave environmental and social issues to the
discretion of CSR committees and female directors.
Fourth, the findings may help policymakers advance CSR implementation in the H&T sector.
As the study connects board configuration to CSRP, policies can be developed for better
configuration of boards and improvement of CSRP. For policymakers, one way is to formulate
corporate governance codes to address board structure, such as fixing the rates of female and nonexecutive directors on boards, requiring firms to establish CSR committees, and setting a meeting
attendance rate for directors. Another way is to take or suggest concrete steps to alleviate the
environmental degradation caused by the H&T sector and enhance social engagement, such as
20

community development. This can be done through governmental and non-governmental tourism
offices or other local bodies concerned with tourism activities.
Finally, the insignificant association between CSRP and firms’ financial performance implies
that CSR initiatives may not yield financial returns in the short term. Firms may have to wait a
long time to realize the financial benefits of such initiatives. Another plausible explanation is that
the H&T sector may expect non-financial benefits (i.e. achieving social legitimacy or community
development) rather than financial gains from CSR activities. Alternatively, the stock market may
not be efficient enough, as it does not reflect CSR information in share values, which may indicate
that firms are not sufficiently communicating their CSR activities with their shareholders8. At this
point, we think that female directors might play a significant role in turning CSR efforts to firm
performance as there are some studies which found a positive association between board diversity
and firm performance (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, &
Laffarga, 2017). They can do that by building relations with the external environment and
stakeholders (Mallin & Michelon, 2011) through traditional and conventional communication
technologies. Hence, corporations might develop new strategies for marketing and investor
relations for better benefiting from female directors in improving not solely CSR performance but
also financial performance. However, to do that, the existing female proportion on boards (16.1%)
may not be sufficient suggesting the need for opening more room to females on boardrooms. Some
studies even suggest regulatory intervention by governmental authorities to raise women
proportion on boards through corporate governance codes (Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017) as some
European countries do (Jiraporn, Bouattour, Hamrouni, & Uyar, 2019). Moreover, the insignificant
association between CSRP and profitability might signal that CSR initiatives are costly
investments that do not allow for improved net income on the income statement. If this is the case,
H&T firms should try to translate CSR initiatives into higher levels of sales revenue to ultimately
improve profitability. They can do this by developing better customer and public relations with
the help of their marketing and customer relations units.
The findings should be considered in light of two main limitations. The sample comprises
H&T firms for the years between 2011 and 2018. Therefore, the results may not be generalizable
for other sectors or may not be valid before the year 2011. The validity of the results could be

8

This comment is relevant particularly for a market-based performance indicator (i.e. Tobin Q).
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checked in other environmentally sensitive industries, such as energy, logistics, aviation,
chemicals, and mining. Future studies could consider institutional or country-level factors beyond
firm-level indicators to check whether they are influential in motivating firms to perform CSR
activities. Particularly for the H&T sector, binding regulations, sanctions or civil society influence
may be more powerful in some countries; this could potentially force sector representatives to
undertake certain CSR exercises. Finally, the insignificant association between CSRP and financial
performance justifies future investigations. Moderators such as the quality of the institutional
environment or the size of the tourism sector could be incorporated in the study models.
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Appendix
Table A
The list of variables, their definitions and the source*
Variables
ESGscore
ENVpilscore
SOCpilscore

Definition
Composite CSR score including environmental, social and corporate governance initiatives
Environmental score which assesses a firm’s impact on ecosystems.
Social score evaluates a company’s engagements to address employees’, customers’, and
society’ expectations.
GOVpilscore
Governance score measures the extent of which a firm’s board members and executives
ensure long-term shareholder interest.
CSRcommittee
Presence of a board-level CSR committee/team in the firm
Bindepend
Board independence as calculated by the ratio of non-executive members on the board
Bdiversity
Board diversity as measured by the ratio of female members on the board
Bdiligence
Board diligence as proxied by board meeting attendance rate of directors
Bsize
Board size as proxied by the number of directors on the board at the end of the fiscal year
CEOduality
Specifies whether CEO chairs the board simultaneously
Freefperc
Free float as a percentage of shares outstanding
Firmsize
Natural logarithm of total assets of a company
Leverage
The proportion of total liabilities to total assets
Profitability
The ratio of net income (after taxes) to total assets
Tobin Q
The total of market capitalization and total debt divided by total assets
* All data were collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon database.
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Figure 1
Hypothesized model of the study
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics (N = 920)
Variables
ESGscore
ENVpilscore
SOCpilscore
GOVpilscore
Bindepend
Bdiversity
Bdiligence
Bsize
Freefperc
Firmsize
Leverage
Profitability
Tobin Q
CSRcommittee

CEOduality

Mean
49.66
50.71
51.55
46.29
73.55
16.10
87.00
9.19
74.23
21.71
60.93
6.86
1.87
Category
Exist
Does not exist
Total
Exist
Does not exist
Total

Std. Dev.
17.23
21.08
21.72
19.73
16.18
12.32
10.44
2.74
23.15
1.41
27.62
7.12
1.50

Min
12.65
15.95
6.53
5.36
0.00
0.00
5.00
1.00
4.06
17.66
5.55
-23.75
0.00
Frequency
425
495
920
414
506
920

Max
92.17
98.68
98.92
92.28
100.00
57.14
100.00
26.00
100.00
24.48
202.97
34.11
9.39
Percent
46.20
53.80
100.00
45.00
55.00
100.00
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Table 2
Pearson’s correlation analysis
Variables
V1
1: ESGscore
1
2: ENVpilscore
0.878*
3: SOCpilscore
0.899*
4: GOVpilscore
0.666*
5: CSRcommittee
0.687*
6: Bindepend
0.281*
7: Bdiversity
0.372*
8: Bdiligence
0.142*
9: Bsize
0.392*
10: CEOduality
-0.013
11: Freefperc
0.162*
12: Firmsize
0.411*
13: Leverage
0.167*
14: Profitability
-0.043
15: Tobin Q
-0.047
Variables
V9
9: Bsize
1
10: CEOduality
0.070*
11: Freefperc
-0.021
12: Firmsize
0.412*
13: Leverage
0.178*
14: Profitability
0.001
15: Tobin Q
-0.001
* shows significance at the.05 level

V2

V3

V4

V5

V6

V7

V8

1
0.761*
0.346*
0.687*
0.214*
0.262*
0.120*
0.416*
0.078*
0.092*
0.424*
0.125*
-0.070*
-0.056
V10

1
0.386*
0.623*
0.339*
0.319*
0.110*
0.380*
-0.097*
0.190*
0.357*
0.168*
-0.059
-0.069*
V11

1
0.349*
0.116*
0.345*
0.123*
0.140*
-0.004
0.112*
0.215*
0.114*
0.038
0.019
V12

1
0.103*
0.173*
0.185*
0.354*
-0.032
0.072*
0.276*
0.054
-0.058
-0.061
V13

1
0.223*
-0.193*
0.241*
0.098*
0.326*
0.102*
0.248*
-0.052
-0.021
V14

1
-0.024
0.175*
-0.115*
0.249*
0.019
0.264*
0.021
0.021
V15

1
-0.160*
-0.363*
-0.181*
-0.181*
-0.229*
0.096*
-0.032
..

1
0.021
0.200*
0.05
-0.013
0.101*

1
0.016
0.165*
-0.056
-0.002

1
0.164*
-0.250*
-0.237*

1
-0.053
0.041

1
0.711*

1

..
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Table 3
Panel data analysis with fixed-effects estimator (Model 1)
(1)
ESGscore
11.4***
(13.15)

(2)
ENVpilscore
14.9***
(14.07)

(3)
SOCpilscore
11.3***
(10.06)

(4)
GOVpilscore
7.58***
(5.19)

Bindepend

0.14***
(3.63)

-0.0035
(-0.07)

0.076
(1.53)

0.37***
(5.76)

Bdiversity

0.32***
(8.78)

0.24***
(5.31)

0.24***
(5.02)

0.51***
(8.30)

Bdiligence

0.12**
(2.34)

0.021
(0.35)

0.13**
(1.97)

0.21**
(2.51)

Bsize

-0.42**
(-2.16)

-0.064
(-0.27)

-0.39
(-1.56)

-0.85**
(-2.58)

CEOduality

-1.78
(-1.46)

-0.52
(-0.35)

-2.31
(-1.46)

-2.59
(-1.26)

Freefperc

0.053
(1.59)

-0.012
(-0.30)

0.052
(1.22)

0.13**
(2.25)

Firmsize

2.42***
(3.12)

4.33***
(4.56)

3.29***
(3.28)

-0.72
(-0.55)

Leverage

0.085***
(3.18)

0.18***
(5.48)

0.015
(0.44)

0.061
(1.36)

Profitability

-0.16***
(-3.03)

-0.032
(-0.50)

-0.24***
(-3.51)

-0.21**
(-2.35)

-64.5***
(-3.01)
Yes
920
0.43
51.88***

-44.1*
(-1.94)
Yes
920
0.24
27.77***

2.06
(0.07)
Yes
920
0.07
15.03***

Independent variables
CSRcommittee

-36.9**
(-2.11)
Firm-year effect
Yes
N
920
Adj. R2
0.45
F-Stat
55.85***
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Constant
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Table 4
Panel data analysis with fixed effects estimator (Model 2)
(1)
Independent
variables
ESGscore

(2)
Tobin Q

(3)

(4)

(6)
(7)
Profitability

(8)

-0.059*
(-1.92)

0.0028
(0.71)

ENVpilscore

(5)

0.0019
(0.58)

SOCpilscore

0.031
(1.22)
-0.059***
(-2.67)

0.00020
(0.07)

GOVpilscore

-0.029*
(-1.85)

0.0014
(0.72)
-0.055
(-0.64)

-0.052
(-0.59)

-0.031
(-0.38)

-0.038
(-0.48)

-1.03
(-1.52)

-1.95***
(-2.85)

-1.04
(-1.61)

-1.40**
(-2.25)

Bindepend

-0.0064*
(-1.83)

-0.0060*
(-1.74)

-0.0060*
(-1.73)

-0.0065*
(-1.84)

-0.035
(-1.29)

-0.045*
(-1.67)

-0.039
(-1.44)

-0.033
(-1.20)

Bdiversity

-0.0016
(-0.42)

-0.0012
(-0.33)

-0.0014
(-0.38)

-0.0019
(-0.51)

0.085***
(2.98)

0.085***
(2.97)

0.079***
(2.78)

0.092***
(3.16)

Bdiligence

0.0019
(0.43)

0.0021
(0.49)

0.0020
(0.46)

0.0018
(0.41)

0.072**
(2.10)

0.071**
(2.05)

0.072**
(2.11)

0.074**
(2.14)

Bsize

0.0033
(0.19)

0.0022
(0.13)

0.0025
(0.14)

0.0035
(0.20)

0.094
(0.69)

0.11
(0.81)

0.096
(0.71)

0.090
(0.66)

0.20*
(1.77)

0.19*
(1.74)

0.20*
(1.81)

0.20*
(1.82)

-1.53*
(-1.77)

-1.75**
(-2.01)

-1.54*
(-1.79)

-1.63*
(-1.89)

Freefperc

-0.00021
(-0.07)

-0.000060
(-0.02)

-0.00014
(-0.05)

-0.00029
(-0.10)

-0.0031
(-0.14)

-0.0034
(-0.15)

-0.0033
(-0.14)

-0.0017
(-0.07)

Firmsize

-0.54***
(-7.51)

-0.54***
(-7.55)

-0.54***
(-7.54)

-0.54***
(-7.46)

-3.65***
(-6.70)

-3.65***
(-6.68)

-3.60***
(-6.61)

-3.70***
(-6.77)

Leverage

0.0047**
(1.96)

0.0046*
(1.89)

0.0048**
(2.00)

0.0048**
(1.98)

-0.064***
(-3.43)

-0.069***
(-3.67)

-0.068***
(-3.66)

-0.065***
(-3.49)

Profitability

0.076***
(15.99)

0.075***
(15.93)

0.075***
(15.90)

0.076***
(15.99)

Constant

12.6***
(7.68)
920
0.262
28.59***

12.6***
(7.74)
920
0.262
28.58***

12.7***
(7.75)
920
0.262
28.55***

12.6***
(7.71)
920
0.262
28.60***

89.2***
(7.22)
920
-0.059
8.01***

86.6***
(7.00)
920
-0.062
7.86***

88.6***
(7.20)
920
-0.054
8.25***

88.6***
(7.18)
920
-0.059
7.99***

CSRcommittee

CEOduality

N
Adj. R2
F–Stat.

t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5
Robustness check for Model 1 using OLS
(1)
ESGscore
17.8***
(22.36)

(2)
ENVpilscore
22.4***
(21.67)

(3)
SOCpilscore
20.3***
(18.25)

(4)
GOVpilscore
9.63***
(7.38)

Bindepend

0.16***
(6.80)

0.12***
(3.89)

0.31***
(9.13)

0.042
(1.07)

Bdiversity

0.32***
(10.22)

0.23***
(5.80)

0.26***
(5.90)

0.48***
(9.43)

Bdiligence

0.24***
(6.20)

0.28***
(5.54)

0.19***
(3.54)

0.25***
(3.96)

Bsize

0.29*
(1.92)

0.78***
(3.91)

0.54**
(2.52)

-0.54**
(-2.14)

CEOduality

0.39
(0.52)

4.17***
(4.19)

-4.52***
(-4.22)

1.91
(1.53)

Freefperc

0.032*
(1.93)

0.0087
(0.41)

0.060***
(2.60)

0.025
(0.91)

Firmsize

3.21***
(10.99)

3.41***
(8.97)

3.34***
(8.17)

2.83***
(5.91)

Leverage

0.0058
(0.37)

0.0088
(0.42)

-0.0026
(-0.12)

0.012
(0.47)

0.11**
(2.18)

0.027
(0.41)

0.075
(1.05)

0.25***
(2.96)

-72.7***
(-9.55)
920
0.631
157.97***

-81.3***
(-8.20)
920
0.581
128.69***

-81.7***
(-7.66)
920
0.544
110.65***

-52.6***
(-4.21)
920
0.242
30.32***

Independent variables
CSRcommittee

Profitability

Constant
N
Adj. R2
F-Stat.

t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 6
Robustness check for Model 2 using OLS
(1)
Independent
Variables
ESGscore

(2)
Tobin Q

(3)

(4)

(6)
Profitability

(7)

(8)

0.047**
(2.18)

0.0038
(1.18)

ENVpilscore

(5)

0.0031
(1.25)

SOCpilscore

0.0067
(0.41)
0.0014
(0.62)

GOVpilscore

0.016
(1.05)
0.039***
(2.96)

0.0013
(0.63)

CSRcommittee

-0.0082
(-0.08)

-0.010
(-0.11)

0.031
(0.34)

0.048
(0.59)

-1.48**
(-2.30)

-0.80
(-1.25)

-0.97
(-1.61)

-1.01*
(-1.91)

Bindepend

-0.0029
(-1.22)

-0.0027
(-1.14)

-0.0028
(-1.12)

-0.0024
(-1.01)

-0.023
(-1.45)

-0.016
(-1.04)

-0.021
(-1.26)

-0.017
(-1.09)

Bdiversity

-0.0016
(-0.49)

-0.0011
(-0.35)

-0.00073
(-0.24)

-0.00097
(-0.30)

0.012
(0.58)

0.026
(1.25)

0.023
(1.13)

0.0086
(0.41)

Bdiligence

-0.011***
(-2.82)

-0.011***
(-2.82)

-0.010***
(-2.69)

-0.010***
(-2.70)

0.044*
(1.69)

0.053**
(2.07)

0.052**
(2.04)

0.045*
(1.77)

Bsize

0.0087
(0.58)

0.0074
(0.49)

0.0090
(0.60)

0.010
(0.70)

0.38***
(3.88)

0.39***
(3.96)

0.39***
(3.94)

0.42***
(4.23)

CEOduality

0.32***
(4.24)

0.31***
(4.05)

0.33***
(4.31)

0.32***
(4.22)

1.04**
(2.09)

1.03**
(2.06)

1.13**
(2.26)

0.98**
(1.97)

Freefperc

0.0013
(0.77)

0.0013
(0.83)

0.0013
(0.79)

0.0013
(0.83)

-0.0081
(-0.76)

-0.0067
(-0.62)

-0.0076
(-0.71)

-0.0076
(-0.70)

Firmsize

-0.14***
(-4.60)

-0.14***
(-4.64)

-0.13***
(-4.47)

-0.13***
(-4.50)

-1.58***
(-8.10)

-1.46***
(-7.58)

-1.49***
(-7.80)

-1.53***
(-8.23)

Leverage

0.0037**
(2.37)

0.0037**
(2.37)

0.0037**
(2.39)

0.0037**
(2.38)

-0.018*
(-1.71)

-0.017*
(-1.69)

-0.017*
(-1.68)

-0.018*
(-1.73)

Profitability

0.15***
(29.19)

0.15***
(29.33)

0.15***
(29.29)

0.15***
(29.13)

Constant

4.38***
(5.60)
920
0.530
95.15

4.36***
(5.63)
920
0.530
95.19

4.22***
(5.48)
920
0.529
94.96

4.17***
(5.53)
920
0.529
94.96

34.8***
(6.88)
920
0.086
9.66

32.1***
(6.39)
920
0.082
9.15

32.9***
(6.58)
920
0.082
9.26

33.3***
(6.85)
920
0.090
10.10

N
Adj. R2
F-Stat.

t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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